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1We analyze the short and long-run price performance of 143 Global Shipping IPOs listed during 
the 1984–2007 period in major Stock Exchanges computing Buy & Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We find average underpricing for shipping 
IPOs is 17.69%. The light underpricing is positively related to the age of the firm, the reputation 
of the stock exchange they reach listing and the market condition of the period they go public 
and negatively related to the reputation of the underwriters. In the long-run, Shipping IPOs 
underperform after five months holding period. Specifically using the buy-and hold returns as a 
benchmark for long-run performance, we reveal that investors who buy immediately after listing 
and hold shares for three years will make a loss of 15.72%. The survey suggests that Global 
Shipping industry surprises us regarding the maturity in the behavior of its investors.    
 
 
1. Introduction 
As shipping companies adjust to a dynamic and rapidly changing environment, so do the 
financial methods and instruments available to raise funding and materialize vital investment 
budgets. The core business strategy of shipping companies in recent days is gradually shifting 
from simple profit maximization to an increase in firm market value, Syriopoulos [1]. To 
achieve this, shipping firms should consistently focus on promoting investment plans that bear 
growth potential and have positive returns that outperform more than required costs undertaken. 
Two broad approaches can be distinguished in shipping capital financing: (i) self-sustained 
(internal) financing and (ii) external financing. In the second financing approach, the company 
turns to the international capital markets to raise the required investment funds. Capital markets 
play a key role in the promotion of shipping business growth and value creation. They act as 
intermediaries to provide the funds required to financing new investment projects and sustain 
business growth. Fresh funds are channelled to shipping firms in need through the issuance of 
securities. This issuance when it happens for first time is called as Initial Public Offering (IPO).  
This paper investigates the underpricing and long-term performance of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of common stocks in Global Shipping Industry (GSI). The purpose of this 
study is to provide a first piece of evidence regarding this sector with the so many unique 
characteristics2. We would like to investigate how the underpricing of Shipping IPOs is affected 
                                                 
1 To whom correspondence should be addressed. email:d.gounopoulos@surrey.ac.uk 
2 Shipping IPOs are distinct from those of ordinary industrial or service companies. The market value of a 
shipping company is often closely associated to the underlying value of the physical assets (vessels). In this respect, 
shipping IPOs bear similarities with the respective IPOs of closed end funds and property companies. Furthermore, 
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by some institutional factors. In addition, we want to examine whether the long-term IPO 
underperformance documented in the United States and other developed markets also applies in 
a sector which bridges the people and contributes in the communication of the nations. 
Many different theories, such as information asymmetry and signaling models, have 
been offered to explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon, Allen and Faulhaber [2]; Grinblatt 
and Hwang [3]; Welch [4]; Chemmanur [5]. IPOs underpricing—the phenomenon of a large 
positive gain to a new issue (relative to its offering price) immediately after listing—has been 
found in many markets. Loughran et. al.  [6] document evidence of IPO underpricing in 25 
countries, with higher figures in emerging than in developed markets. Compared with vast 
literature on individual country studies, the magnitude of studies on individual sectors is limited 
and specifically global shipping industry has been explored in the past only by Grammenos and 
Marcoulis [7] with a very small sample of 31 IPOs.  
On early long run return evidences for IPOs, Ritter [8] and Loughran and Ritter [9] 
found that IPOs in the US underperform significantly relative to non-issuing firms for 3 to 5 
years after the listing date. Many studies also provide international evidence on the long run 
underperformance of IPOs that is consistent with what has been observed in the US market as, 
Lee et al [10] in Australia, Cai and Wei [11] in Japan, Brounen and Eichholtz [12] in Sweden, 
Jaskiewicz [13] in Germany, Khurshed et. al. [14] in the United Kingdom, Chahine [6] in 
France, and Thomadakis et. at. [6] in Greece. In a pan-European study underperformance is 
documented by Gajeski and Gresse [15] for a sample covering 15 countries. They refer that 
long-term abnormal returns in Europe are negative. 
The aim of the present study is to analyze various performance features of Shipping 
IPOs and to test if theories can adequately explain their behavior in the aftermarket. The study 
employs the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) of the IPOs for 6, up to 36 months of listing in the 
market, the cumulative average returns (CARs) on a three-year basis to better test the stability 
and the Fama and French [16] three factor model. We find that using the BHAR and CAR 
benchmarks, there is significant overperformance in the first 5 months. Over the next months 
and up to 36th, there is underperformance which is confirmed as well across all benchmarks 
used. We therefore identify reducing over-performance as we are moving towards to six months 
after listing and underperformance as a robust feature over the last 2 ½ years we explore.  
This study mainly makes four contributions to the international literature. First, it provides 
the first global evidence on the performance of IPOs in this crucial for many countries sector. 
The results show that Shipping IPOs underperform in long term, a finding that is consistent with 
Ritter’s (1991) study for the US which underlines the fact that new listings significantly 
underperform even six months subsequent to listing. Second, this study investigates possible 
explanations for the short and long-run performance of the Shipping IPOs by using various 
factors concerning the global shipping environment market. 
Third, we move on a comparative study as shipping firms of our sample have been listed in 
more than 10 different stock exchanges. We search among two options i.e. to list in one of the 
leading stock exchanges or to list in the local stock markets (country of shipping IPOs 
originality). Fourth the results indicate negative relationship between long-term IPO returns and 
initial underpricing. In particular, we find that new listings in shipping industry takes higher 
prices at the end of the first aftermarket day but the prices becomes lower than the offer price 
values in the long-run. The possible interpretation of this outcome is that the offering price set 
                                                                                                                                                            
due to extensive information flows in international vessel sales and purchase markets, shipping IPOs tend to exhibit 
lower information asymmetry. Due to the cyclical nature of shipping business, shipping companies tend to prefer 
equity markets when shipping market prospects appear to be promising 
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by issuers and underwriters is not very underpriced and reflects the firm’s underlying 
fundamental value. This finding makes more difficult the answer to the question of why some 
offerings have extremely substantial initial returns and following positive post-listing returns 
when these IPOs afford no underpriced listing prices. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
regarding the short and long term performance on countries with strong shipping background, 
while there is a review on the rationale behind the decision of shipping firms to go public. Data 
and methodology are presented in Section 3, whereas Sections 4 and 5 provides the empirical 
findings. Section 6 summarizes the main results and concludes the paper by offering further 
recommendations for future research. Finally, Appendixes A & B provide details on the 
Leading Global Shipping IPO Stocks by Market Capitalization and on Stock Price of Selected 
Shipping Companies since IPO in the U.S. 
 
2. Background 
The initial return of an IPO relates the difference between the equilibrium price following the 
issue and the IPO price. The post-IPO equilibrium price is the first trade price following the 
IPO, or the first closing price, or a closing price observed a few days after the IPO date, Ritter 
[17]. The IPO price, by definition, is the price at which the new shareholders buy the shares at 
issue. It is jointly decided by the underwriter and the listing firm at the end of the IPO procedure 
according to financial analysts’ valuations and the demand expressed for the shares, The 
definitive offer price is generally lower than the first equilibrium price, which is well known 
under the term of IPO underpricing, Ljungqvist [18]. This part of our work is devoted to 
providing an overview of IPO performance in Global Shipping Industry. The following 
subsection documents initial returns and long-run performance in various strongly shipping 
related countries. 
 
2.1 Performance of IPOs in strongly Shipping Countries 
Loughran et. al. [19] in their updated global study on the level of underpricing report   initial 
returns for a sample of 15,490 US IPOs of 18%. On the long-term performance field and in a 
sample of 1,526 US IPOs, (issued between 1975-1984), Ritter [8] found that they 
underperformed their market benchmarks by about -34.47% in the three year period, whereas 
Ritter and Welch [20] indicate that three-year holding-period returns for an investor, buying at 
the offer price, would on average underperform the market significantly.  
In the UK as can been seen in Table 1, Champers and Dimson [21] and Gajeski & Gresse 
[15] investigated short and long-term performance of a sample of 1,987 and 306 IPOs 
respectively issued during 1987-2007 for the short term and 1995-2004 for the long term. 
Champers and Dimson [21] report that British IPOs are underpriced by 19.0% and Gajeski & 
Gresse [15] indicate that they offer negative returns in a three-year period by -27.74%. 
Furthermore, a study of Danish IPOs, concluded that the market performed better than the IPO 
stocks and the volatility adjusted under performance of the IPOs, compared to the market, was -
30.4% after five years, while the level of underpricing has been only 8.1%, one of the lowest 
percentages globally. Surprisingly though, IPOs in Sweden were found to have a long-run over 
performance, rather than negative long-term returns. Brounen and Eichholz [12] found a 
positive over-performance equal to 18.89%. The short term performance of Swedish IPOs based 
on a sample of 406 firms is 27.3%. 
Consistent with previous studies, the mean raw return for the 2,104 European IPOs composing 
Gajeski and Gresse [15] sample on their first day of trading is very positive and equals 22.06%. 
They calculate raw returns in logarithmic terms according to 4 different post-issue prices: the 
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first closing price following the IPO, the closing price on the 5th trading day following the IPO, 
the closing price on the 10th trading day following the IPO and the closing price one month 
after the issue. The average 1st trading day adjusted return rises to 22.01%, a value that is not 
significantly different from the average raw return of 22.06%. These abnormal returns do not 
disappear in the short run and even grow slightly until the end of the first month of listing in 
most cases. Gajeski and Gresse [15] report on a sample of smaller sample of 1,846 IPOs when 
measuring 3-year performance that the long-term abnormal returns are frequently negative, but 
vary over time and across countries. They find a significant three-year underperformance with 
each measure: - 32.61% for BHAR, and –87.19% for CAR.  
 
 
Table 1. Global Evidence on Short and Long term performance of IPOs 
Country  Researcher  Sample 
Size 
Time Period Average Initial 
Return3 
Average 3 year 
Long term 
Australia Lee et al. [10] 266 1976-1989 19.8% -51.25% 
China Chan et al [22] 570 1993-1998 164.5% 75.07% 
Denmark Jakobsen and Sorensen [23] 76 1984-1992 8.1% -30.4% 
Italy  Arosio et al [24] 108 1985-1997 18.2% -11.53% 
Finland Keloharju [25] 79 1984-1989 17.2% -21% 
France Chahine [6]  172 1996-1998 10.7% -9.4% 
Germany Stehle et al [26]  187 1960-1992 26.9% -6% 
Greece Thomadakis et al [27]  254 1994-2002 38.94% -15.35% 
Sweden Loughran et al [19]  162 1980-1990 27.3% 1.2% 
UK Gajeski and Gresse [15] 306 1995-2004  -27.74% 
 Champers and Dimson [21]  1987 1987-2007 19%  
US Ritter [8]  1,526 1975-1994 18% -34.47% 
 Aggarwal  and Rivoli [28] 1,598 1977-1987  -13.73 
Europe  Gajeski and Gresse (2006) 1,846 1988-1998  -32.61% 
Statistics on these initial and long term returns are reported in Table 1 for each country 
strongly related with Shipping Sector. The key role of equity markets on shipping business has 
been surprisingly neglected in past empirical research. An exception is Grammenos and 
Marcoulis [7], who studied shipping IPOs in a cross-country framework. A sample of 31 IPO 
cases was examined in seven different countries (US, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Hong Kong and Singapore), over 1983–1995. Gearing was indicated to be the single most 
statistically significant factor in explaining IPO stock market performance. Furthermore, the 
average initial day return of Shipping IPOs was found to be 5.32%. IPO costs were estimated at 
8% of the amount raised with a high-fixed cost component in average direct costs. The highest 
direct costs were in the US stock markets and the lowest in Norway.  
 
2.2 Shipping companies going public 
 
Investment decisions in the shipping industry constitute a significant element of business 
uncertainty, since varying and persistent volatility is apparent between different shipping market 
segments. This is due to based a number of critical factors, including mainly the derived nature 
                                                 
3 Evidence from short term performance is from Loughran et al (1994) updated in 2008.  
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of demand for shipping services that is sensitive to economic growth, the cyclicality in freight 
rates and vessel prices, and the idiosyncratic sectoral characteristics of the shipping industry 
McGroarty [29]. Intensive capital resources tied-up in the underlying real assets (vessels) and 
can induce tremendous financial risk that, at times, may lead to adverse outcomes. As a 
consequence, financing tools shipping companies employ are in the core of shipping business. 
Capital markets play a key role in the promotion of shipping business growth and value 
creation by performing the following fundamental functions. As primary markets, capital 
markets act as intermediaries to provide the funds required to financing new investment projects 
and sustain business growth. Fresh funds are channeled to firms in need through the issuance of 
securities. Furthermore, as secondary markets, capital markets provide an efficient mechanism 
for trading outstanding securities. They contribute, thus, to potential value creation that is 
reflected on corporate security prices. 
As the business environment changes dynamically in the shipping industry, shipping 
companies turn to new financial instruments and markets (mainly to US) to finance their 
investment plans. A gradual shift is apparent in shipping finance more recently, driven by 
economic recessions and crises in the world markets. This move has been reinforced by the 
interactive impact of a number of factors as erosion of the capital reserves in many shipping 
companies, substantial contraction of banking finance, substantial capital requirements to 
replace the ageing wet and dry fleets worldwide, internationalization and integration of world 
capital markets and structural and cultural reorganization of shipping companies, induced by 
capital markets requirements and investors’ expectations, Syriopoulos [30]. 
Despite their central role in investment funding, stock markets had traditionally only limited 
participation in shipping finance. Close family ownership ties, reluctance of shipowners to 
dilute company control, nondisclosure of sensitive company information and unattractiveness of 
shipping stocks to institutional and private investors, due to volatile cash flows, have been major 
reasons for that, Grammenos and Marcoulis [7].  
Only recently shipping companies have discovered the virtues of public listing on 
international stock exchanges. The Shipping IPO wave of period 2000-2007 has tackled 
investors’ appetite, as the latter rediscover the attractiveness of exchange traded shipping 
companies. This trend has been supported by unprecedented high-freight rates and strong 
shipping company balance sheets in an environment of bullish stock markets. Steady growth 
rates in the US economy and high-growth rates in the Chinese economy over the period 2003- 
2007 led the shipping sector to a peak in late 2007, generating strong earnings cash flows for 
shipping companies. 
A fundamental problem for shipping companies interested in raising equity in the stock 
market is the pricing of the new issues. Since the majority of shipping IPOs refer to bulk 
shipping offerings, the issuer will set an IPO price at or near market-adjusted net asset value 
(NAV) per share. This is reasonable in cases where company earnings and cash flows fully 
support NAV, Stokes [31]. In practice, however, ship prices in the second-hand market do not 
necessarily reflect operating cash flow and earnings generated by the ships. More frequently, 
ship prices represent a very high multiple of operating cash flow, whereas in certain bulk 
shipping segments operating earnings have been negative for a number of years4.  
 
                                                 
4 Stokes (1997) assumes that a shipping company can borrow at a spread over Libor (+1% to 2%), this can result to 
borrowing costs on senior debt of 7%. Subordinate debt might cost 10–12% per annum, on a 10-year maturity. 
Investors, however, will typically seek a return on equity of 15–20% per annum, given the volatile freight markets 
and their risk exposure. This implies that most shipping companies, rated below investment grade, must attain 
return on equity well above average stock market returns in order to prevent their share price declining. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
A sample of 143 Global Shipping IPOs, was obtained for the period 1984-2007. Basic sources 
for the construction of the IPO database were the Annual Statistical Bulletins of the Stock 
Exchanges and the Prospectuses of companies. Data on long term total returns including both 
capital gains and dividend payments were computed from monthly returns data collected from 
DataStream and Bloomberg. Similarly, the returns on the indexes are measured as total returns 
including dividends. Share prices and prices of the General S.E. Index are collected at pre-
determined time points during the first three years of stocks’ trading in the market. Appendix B 
provides a list of Selected Shipping Companies since IPO in the U.S. including their offer prices 
and prices in the end of the first day of trading. 
A breakdown of these new listings per country, per stock market and per period is found 
in Table 2. New York S.E. and Nasdaq experienced the largest number of intakes. In particular, 
during the period we cover the common stocks of 55 new companies were listed in those two 
leading Stock Markets. It follows Oslo S.E. with 15 entries while London S.E. has only 6 
listings. Surprisingly it is not US with the majority of Global Listed Shipping firms but Greece 
with 29 IPOs. Despite the big number of Greek entries only 6 of those were listed in the local 
Athens Stock Exchange. Opposite is the trend for Norway IPOs as all the fifteen Norwegian 
firms were listed in Oslo. In support to our view ‘only recently shipping companies have 
discovered the virtues of public listing’ there have been only 38 firms listed before the 
millennium. The rest were listed after 2000 and especially in Norway 14 out of 15 IPOs were 
listed in the end of the covered period. We should point out that the distribution of IPOs takes 
into consideration the entrance day of common stocks in the stock markets and not according to 
the public offering time period.  
 
Table 2. Number of Shipping issues listed in global stock markets by year and by market: 
Time period: 1/1/1984 – 31/12/2007 
Country of 
Domicile 
Number of 
Issues 
Market of 
Listing 
Number of Issues Listed before 
2000 
Listed after 
2000 
Belgium 3 Brussels S.E. 2 0 2 
Bermuda  7 OTC 4 2 2 
China  5 Shanghai S.E. 1 0 1 
Denmark 6 Copenhagen S.E. 5 1 4 
Finland 4 Helsinki S.E. 3 2 1 
Germany  3 Berlin S.E. 4 1 3 
Greece 29 Athens S.E 6 5 1 
Hong Kong 4 Hong Kong S.E. 5 0 5 
India  6 Bombay S.E. 6 1 5 
Norway  15 Oslo S.E. 15 1 14 
Singapore 6 Singapore S.E. 7 4 3 
Sweden  5 Stockholm S.E. 6 3 2 
UK 4 London S.E. 6 1 5 
USA 27 NYSE 30 9 21 
  NASDAQ 25 3 22 
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Other 19 Other S.Es 18 5 14 
TOTAL  143  143 38 105 
 
3.1 Methodology 
Some authors (Brav et. al. [32]; Drobetz et. al. [33]; Álvarez and González, [34]) show that 
measured performance strongly depends on the selected methodology. We first analyse both 
initial returns and aftermarket returns. Then cross-sectional analyses are employed in an attempt 
to explore factors determining IPO performance. Finally, regression analyses are undertaken.  
Coming to Shipping IPOs the underpricing of an issue is calculated as the return on the 
first day of trading relative to the offering price. 
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Where Ret0 is the average return (underpricing) of the IPO on the first trading day (day 0), Pi0 is 
the closing price of stock i on day 0, and Pit is the offering price of stock i. We also adjust the 
return for the market effect:    
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Where AdjRet0 is the average of the market adjusted returns (including dividends) of 
IPOs on day 0, Pi,m0  is the closing value of the corresponding stock exchanges market index on 
the first trading day of the new issue i, Pi,m1  is the closing value of the corresponding stock 
exchange market index on the offering day of the new issue i.   
In order to gain further understanding we analyze share returns in the three year 
subsequent to listing. ’Fads’ or ‘speculative bubble’ explanations of initial underpricing suggest 
a link between initial returns and post listing performance, as do those explanations in which 
underpricing is modeled as a signal for future performance. However, the direction of the 
relationship between initial and subsequent performance differs between these two approaches, 
so that analysis of ‘long run’ returns represents an important input into a thorough analysis of 
underpricing.   
For the purposes of the study, the measure of the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) will be 
used so as to evaluate the long-run performance of the Global Shipping IPOs. This methodology 
involves the calculation of the three years buy-and-hold returns assuming that the stocks are 
held from their public offering period or from the first trading day after their listing, to the three-
year anniversary of their listings.  
The measurement of long-term performance is a complex matter. Three categories of 
measures are commonly implemented in the literature: buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
cumulated abnormal returns and constant terms from multi-factor models. All closing stock 
prices are adjusted for share capital increases and stock splits that possibly happened during the 
three-year period5. 
                                                 
5 These calculations are appropriate because the equilibrium prices of stocks in the stock exchange reflect not only 
the special characteristics of each company but they also embody, at the process of their shaping, the ascending or 
descending trends of the stock market. So, the adjusted returns must be calculated, especially when the returns 
under consideration refer to a longer period, as it happens with the returns of this study. 
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The adjusted return for issue i is defined as the raw return less the corresponding market 
return for the same time period used for raw return calculation: 
 
                                                        arit= rit–  rmt                                                               (3) 
 
where rit is monthly raw return for IPO in month t; rmt is monthly market return in month t. 
The average benchmark adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t, ARt, 
is the equally weighted and value weighted arithmetic mean of the benchmark adjusted returns. 
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The CAR from event month q to event month s is calculated by cumulating the mean 
benchmark-adjusted returns
 
over various intervals during the 36-month aftermarket period, q to 
s, as follows 
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These CARs exclude the initial return by treating the return index on the first day of listing 
as a purchase price. The cumulative mean benchmark-adjusted return for months 1 to 36, CAR1,36 
thus involves monthly rebalancing to achieve equal weighting each month, Ritter [8]). 
The average benchmark-adjusted cumulative return of IPOs following introduction is the 
arithmetic equally-weighted mean of individual cumulative abnormal returns 
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The calculation of the aftermarket return does not fully take the effect of different risk 
levels into account6. The average market adjusted returns (ARt) and the cumulative abnormal 
return (CARs) for each month are tested for their significance. 
To test the null hypothesis that the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is equal to zero 
for the sample of IPO firms, we employ a conventional t-statistic. The t statistics for the ARt 
series are calculated as:   
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Abnormal returns are strongly dependent on the benchmark used. Previous studies 
suggest that the measure of long-run performance for IPOs is sensitive to the benchmark used. 
Barber and Lyon [35] show that when long-run, buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated 
                                                 
6 It is assumed that IPOs have the same systematic risk as the market benchmark employed in the test, but it does 
not alter the direction of the results. Balvers et al. (1993) have documented that the systematic risk of new issues is 
greater than one which is the systematic risk of the market index. The assumption that IPOs have the same 
systematic risk as the market index, therefore, provides an upward bias in the estimation of the returns and 
strengthens the results (Ritter, 1991, and Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990). 
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using a reference portfolio, the test statistics are negatively biased. This bias is, however, not 
present when abnormal returns are calculated as the return of a sample firm less the return of a 
single control firm matched on size or book/market ratio. Furthermore, Brav and Gompers [36] 
have shown empirically that when controlling for size or book to market ratio effects, the long-
term underperformance of IPOs decreases, or even disappears. In support to previous evidence 
we make use of Fama and French [16] three Factors model (to calculate the abnormal return εi), 
a multi-factor model in which stock or portfolio returns are regressed on a fixed number of 
common factors, the first factor being invariably the market return and the intercept representing 
the mean abnormal performance.  
 
 
ptttftmtftpt HMLSMBRRaRR   )[()(                            (8) 
 
where Rpt is the IPO portfolio return in month t, is the one-month U.S. Base Lending Rate, observed 
at the beginning of the month, Rft is the treasury bill (T-bill) return in event month t and Rmt is the 
monthly market return of the every associated7 Stock Exchange Composite Index8.  
The next step involves the implementation of multivariate regression, in order to check 
for explanation of cross-sectional differences of the long-run performance of the IPOs. We have 
identified a number of potential determinants for the short and long-term underperformance of 
the IPOs, however for the purposes of a study on the shipping industry, six of them were 
selected and their significance levels are going to be examined. Therefore, the regression model 
is specified as follows: 
 
Pt = a + β1 Log(1+AGE) + β2 (MRK) + β3 (UND) + β4 Log(SIZE) + β5 (H/C) + β6 (EXC) + εi (9) 
 
Where ‘AGE’, is the age of the issuing firm calculated as the number of years that each listing 
firm is in operation since its constitution before the year of listing, ‘MRK’ is the market where 
the Global Shipping IPOs has been classified (We insert the value‘1’ if an IPO listed in Main 
Market, and ‘0’ if listed in Secondary/Parallel/New Market). UND is the Underwriters 
reputation getting ‘1’ for reputable underwriters9 and ‘0’ for non reputable. ‘SIZE’ is the 
logarithm of the market capitalisation of an IPO, H/C describes the period of listing: IPOs listed 
in the Hot Period get the value of ‘1’ and IPOs listed in Cold Period get the value ‘0’ and finally 
‘EXC’ is the reputation of the stock exchange Shipping IPOs are listed, ‘1’ for reputable stock 
exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE) and ‘0’ for non reputable.  
 
4. Aftermarket performance   
 
4.1 Determinants of Shipping IPOs underpricing 
                                                 
7 It can be New York Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ etc 
8 SMBi is the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the size factor in the stock returns, namely the 
difference between the equal-weight mean of the returns on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, 
constructed independently from the book-to-market value portfolio, and HMLi is the monthly return on the zero 
investment portfolio for the book-to-market equity factor in stock returns, namely the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio stocks, 
constructed independently from the size portfolio. 
9 We consider as reputable underwriters the following five institutions: Citigroup, Goldman and Sachs, J.P Morgan, 
Merrill Lynch and UBS  
 10 
We will include several variables to explain cross-sectional variations of underpricing. The first 
variable is the history of a firm prior to going public, (AGE). Unlike in technology sector where 
the great majority of the firms have short history, it is typical in shipping industry, the new 
issues to be offered for public subscription with more than ten years history before their listing 
on the stock exchanges. Due to the asymmetric information distribution among the issuer, 
underwriters and investors (Baron [37]; Rock [38]) and to the fact that funds will be tied up, a 
short history before going public will increase the risk to investors so that a larger underpricing 
is required. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between AGE and underpricing. 
The second variable is the regulated market (MRK) in which the Shipping IPOs have 
been listed. In principle, on every stock exchange, a company has a choice between three 
regulated market segments in which to list its shares: the ‘Main Market’ designed for the listing 
of large companies, the ‘Parallel Market’ that caters to middle and small capitalisations and the 
‘New Market’ for growing companies10. Firms that are listed mainly in the ‘Parallel Market’ 
and the ‘New Market’, will underprice their shares, because they need to attract a large number 
of small shareholders to create a broader ownership structure. However,  being at a disadvantage 
in terms of the information they have at their disposal, small investors participate in an IPO if 
they are compensated for the adverse selection costs they incur, that is if the IPO is sufficiently 
underpriced, Gajeski and Gresse [15]. 
The third variable is the underwriters’ reputation (UND)11. Typically, a banking 
syndicate or an investment bank, called ‘the underwriter’, is involved in developing the 
admission statement and is in charge of the flotation and underwriting process. The underwriter 
is chosen by the IPO candidate after a so-called ‘beauty contest’ at which banks or other 
financial institutions present their proposals for the IPO. Ruud [39] finds that underwriters 
stabilise stock prices during a short period of time after the IPO so as to avoid a failure of the 
issue. Prices are artificially supported at a high level in the short run, but at the end of the 
stabilisation period, performance decreases. According to Carter et al. [40], based on three 
measures of underwriter bank prestige, mean long-term underperformance of firms introduced 
by more prestigious underwriters is weaker. This result acts in favour of the hypothesis of 
underwriter reputation, according to which the selection of a highly ranked underwriter would 
be a good signal for the market with regard to the risk borne in the post-IPO period. Therefore, 
we expect a negative relation between UND and underpricing.  
The fourth variable is the size of IPO measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
number of shares times the offer price, Log (SIZE). To determine if the price reaction to 
Shipping IPOs is affected by offer size, as shown by Chalk and Peavy [41] and Ibbotson et. al. 
[42] for U.S. IPOs, we dissect our sample into four size categories (Table 3). The literature 
                                                 
10 Some exchanges make exceptions to this rule. First, the Stockholm stock exchange (OMX, Sweden), the Vienna 
stock exchange (VSE, Austria) and the Warsaw stock exchange (WSE, Poland) never opened a New Market, and 
the Swiss exchange (SWX) and Deutsche Börse recently closed their New Markets. Second, the LSE and Euronext 
Amsterdam do not have a specific market segment for the listing of medium and small capitalisations since their 
Main Markets accept all firms, independent of size considerations, unless market capitalisation exceeds GBP 
700,000 at the LSE and shareholders’ equity is over EUR 5 millions on Euronext Amsterdam. At the LSE, the 
market segmentation between large, middle and small capitalisation stocks only applies to the secondary market, 
which is organized in different trading platforms according to liquidity and market recognition criteria 
11 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that investors use the investment bank’s past performance, as measured 
by the quality of firms in which they have previously sold equity, to assess their credibility. Given these 
considerations, we ranked underwriters based on their market share and paid-in capital. We also employed a survey 
of brokers on the trading floor to check the quantitative ranking results used in previous studies. The underwriters’ 
ranks place them  in one of three categories, where one represents the most prestigious underwriter and three the 
least prestigious underwriter. 
 11 
(Brav and Gompers, 1997; Stehle et al., 2000; Schuster, 2002; Drobetz et al., 2005;) indicates 
that long-term performance is sensitive to size. Several authors, especially Brav and Gompers 
(1997), Stehle et al. [26], Brav et al. [32], argue that benchmarks built upon size give more 
reliable results. 
The opportunities12 for an IPO may be determined by the fifth adopted variable, market 
conditions. Lowry [43] suggests that in a bullish market, the number of IPOs tends to increase 
because the placement of stocks is easier, the risk of failure of an IPO is lower and securities are 
priced higher, which softens the cost of initial underpricing. Most investors globally are not 
country specific, Ritter [44]. They look at one big Global market and its index. In that case IPOs 
made under hot market conditions, which represents heavy interest by investors in the IPO, are 
expected to yield larger returns in the first few trading days than IPOs made in a cold market. 
The prices of hot market IPOs reverse as a result of change in beliefs of investors who realize 
that too much optimism may be attributed to the new issues (overvaluation) under the hot 
market conditions after some time elapses following the IPO. This reversion in prices relative to 
the market generates underperformance of IPOs made in hot markets. Nonetheless since 2003, 
four of the largest Global markets – US, UK13, Germany and France have enjoyed a five year 
stock market rally and a bullish market for IPOs.  
Buttimer et. al. [45] and Freybote et. al. [6] on their studies define a hot IPO market as a 
period during which at least ten IPOs are conducted per year. The number of IPOs per annum 
indicates that our twenty four-year observation period is characterized by four successive sub-
periods: a ‘cold’ period from 1984 to 1997, a ‘hot’ market in 1998-2000, an extremely ‘cold’ 
market from the end of 2000 to 2002 and an extremely ‘hot’ period from 2003 to end of 2007. 
From 2003 onwards, there have been at least 10 shipping IPOs per year so by definition this 
period can be regarded as hot IPO market. The average number of Shipping IPOs per year in our 
sample totaled 11.1 between 1998 and 2007. However, there have been approximately 3 
Shipping IPOs per year between 1988 and 1997 and only 2 IPOs in total between 1984 and 
1987. Hence it justified to classify the period 1998-2007 as a hot IPO market for shipping 
companies around the world. This hypothesis is further supported by practitioners such as 
Merrill Lynch [30] who refer to the Global Shipping market in 2005 as a bull market. 
 The sixth variable, ‘EXC’ is mainly determined by the reputation of the stock exchange 
where the IPOs are listed. We classify our sample in two big categories: shipping IPOs which 
are listed in the main global stock markets (NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE) and firms listed in all 
other stock exchanges.  We hypothesize based on the more strict entrance standards which we 
meet in the mature markets that there is a negative relationship between Shipping IPOs listed in 
the main stock exchanges and the underpricing. 
 
4.2 Determinants of long run performance  
  Following previous country studies, our long term return period covers the first, second 
and third year of trading, i.e., it relates the first, second and third closing year price to the end of 
                                                 
12 According to the timing hypothesis, managers choose a window of opportunity to launch an IPO, this window 
being identified as a function of the firm’s performance or market conditions. First, managers prefer to take their 
firms public when they have performed well earlier, and probably the IPO date is conditional on the firm’s cycle of 
activity and operational performance. Second, the window of opportunity for an IPO may be determined by market 
conditions. In a bullish market, the number of IPOs tends to increase because the placement of stocks is easier, the 
risk of failure of an IPO is lower and securities are priced higher, which softens the cost of initial underpricing. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) as well as Helwege and Liang (2001) show that firms going public during ‘hot markets’ 
have more severe long-term underperformance than other firms. 
13 The UK’s IPO market has been robust, heavily weighted with jumbo listings in 2006. The UK’s 151 deals were 
the fifth highest number of IPOs in the world in 2006 and raised US $17.2 billion.  
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the first day of trading price of an issue. We calculate benchmark-adjusted returns as the 
adjusted return on a stock minus the benchmark return over the first, second and third year of 
trading. We use daily returns on the total stock markets indexes provided by DataStream and 
Bloomberg as the benchmark. The underlying trading strategy is ex ante implementable and 
follows a simple rule: Each IPO is bought at the end of first day of trading and sold at the end of 
first, second and third year of trading. Because there is no ex ante information about a specific 
weighting scheme, the long term returns are equally weighted, i.e., the same amount of money is 
invested in every IPO. 
Panel A reports the distribution of two and three-year holding period returns for all the 
143 Shipping IPOs and their matching firms. The median IPO 3–year return is -27.00% 
contrasted with the positive 22.54% for the median matching firm. In line with Ritter (1991) the 
distribution of IPO 3-year holding period returns is more skewed than that of the matching 
firms. 
 Panel B segments IPOs by market capitalization during the offer price period. Appendix 
A helps us get an idea of the Leading Global Shipping IPOs categorized by Market 
Capitalization as it indicates that A.P. Moller from Denmark has been by far the largest with 
32.67 billion dollars. A first glance in the numbers in Panel B show that there is a trend for 
larger offers to have better aftermarket performance in both 2-years and 3-years returns. 
Matching firms’ adjusted long term returns do not drive to any secure findings as there is almost 
no fluctuation among the different periods of this study. If the sample will be segregated in four 
parts i.e. IPOs with market capitalization smaller than $200 million (small IPOs), IPOs of 
capitalization between $200-400 million (second) and $400-600 million (third) and finally with 
IPOs having market capitalization larger than €800 million (large IPOs), the BHAR of the firms 
with small capitalization proves to be -18.33% and -15.56% for 2- and 3-years while the BHAR 
for IPOs with large capitalization is 15.32% for two and 11.11% for three years.  The result is 
consistent with what we expect to find and especially that IPOs issued by large firms, tend to 
perform better in the long-run, gaining higher and significant returns. Our results confirm Ritter 
(1991) evidence that, larger offers have better aftermarket performance.  
Panel C, classifies IPOs based on their age at the time of going public. We find strong 
relation between age and long term performance as the more the years in shipping business the 
better the long term performance of an IPO. In line with Ritter (1991) we interpret the poor long 
run performance of the younger shipping IPOs, which typically face higher levels of risk. 
Comparison between 2 and three years after going public reveals that returns become weaker as 
the time moves on.     
In panel D, firms are categorized by the stock exchange of issuance. The results show 
that Shipping IPOs listed in the mature market of U.S experience low level of underpricing in 
the long term which is 13.85% for Nasdaq and only 5.55% for NYSE three years after going 
public. Less developed markets experience either high level of underpricing or overpricing. 
Specifically Shipping IPOs listed in Athens S.E. were underpriced by 47.50% while there are a 
number of countries which present overpricing on their Shipping IPOs as Bombay with 
134.05%, Oslo with 103.56% Stockholm with -96.64% and Copenhagen with 93.15%.   
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Table 3. Distributional statistics for long run average market index adjusted returns and 
aftermarket performance categorized by Gross Proceeds, Age of the Issuing Firm and 
Year of going public 
Panel A: Three-year holding period returns are calculated as [Π756(1+ridt)-1]*100 where ridt is the daily return on stock i. For IPOs that were 
delisted before the 3-year anniversary, the total return is calculated until the delisting date. The corresponding matching firm‘s total return is 
calculated over the same truncated return interval. Panel B: Gross proceeds are measured in Euros of 2000 purchasing power using the official 
European Union exchange rate with Greek Drahmas, €1=340.75 drh. Initial returns are computed as ripo-rmatching firm over the initial return interval. 
The three year holding period return is calculated excluding the initial return. Total return includes both capital gains and dividends. Panel C: 
The IPOs are categorized based on their age the year of going public.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of three year holding period returns  
 Two years holding period total return Three years holding period total return in percent  
Rank Initial Public 
Offering (%) 
Matching Firm 
(%) 
Initial Public 
offering (%) 
Matching Firm 
(%) 
 
 
Minimum -154.33 -96.46 -220.79 -88.75  
25th percentile -75.90 -12.84 -95.30 -19.58  
Median -10.41 31.93 -27.00 22.54  
75th percentile 48.36 76.32 37.99 61.49  
Maximum 346.03 107.76 326.54 102.56  
      
           Panel B: Aftermarket performance categorized by Market Capitalization 
Market Cap $     Sample Size 
<200 mil -18.33 41.27 -15.56 48.34 36 
201 mil – 400 mil  0.90 46.13 0.79 49.65 37 
401 mil – 800 mil 2.64 40.49 -3.96 45.18 35 
> 800 mil    15.32 44.74 11.11 47.82 35 
           Panel C: Aftermarket performance categorized by Age of the Issuing firm 
Age in Year   Sample Size 
0-5 -2.70 37.68 -21.72 44.84 50 
6-10 -14.54 40.52 -26.58 51.26 31 
21-50 17.95 41.89 8.21 49.63 31 
50-up 22.07 43.12 10.29 55.17 31 
Panel D: Aftermarket performance categorized by Stock Exchange of Listing 
Stock Exchange 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months  
Athens  84.30 66.46 78.20 47.50 6 
Bombay -93.81 -97.73 -116.86 -134.05 6 
Copenhagen -43.15 -56.03 -75.98 -93.15 5 
NASDAQ 7.97 16.96 28.79 13.85 25 
New York S.E, 17.23 8.21 21.94 5.55 30 
Oslo S.E. -93.74 -98.63 -99.29 -103.56 15 
Singapore S.E -33.98 -3.24 18.88 -16.05 7 
Stockholm S.E -84.76 -90.31 -95.51 -96.64 6 
Others 0.89 2.60 8.16 5.10 43 
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4.2. Summary Statistics for the Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of IPOs. 
Table 4 provides the average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of Global Shipping 
IPOs listed during the period 1984-2007. Panel A shows the adjusted returns that are calculated 
taking as a reference point the listing price of new issues and the closing price of the  
 
Table 4. Buy-And-Hold Adjusted Returns for Global Shipping IPOs: Time Period 1984-2007 
Panel A: Excess or Adjusted Returns based on the listing price  
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
1st day 17.69 32.01 143 8.69 -25.56 201.45 
6 months -13.52 68.74 143 -6.74 -139.60 215.38 
12 months -9.91 81.76 141 -16.86 -139.02 311.78 
24 months -4.40 95.55 134 -15.76 -154.13 343.85 
36 months -15.72 104.48 127 -27.85 -220.79 309.78 
       
Panel B: Excess or Adjusted Returns based on the first day closing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
6 months -23.56 57.91 143 -17.51 -136.65 270.57 
12 months -21.12 67.93 142 -25.18 -144.30 288.32 
24 months -18.05 87.03 134 -25.13 -159.86 241.50 
36 months -29.17 87.69 127 -41.96 -228.96 281.26 
       
Panel C: Excess or Adjusted Returns based on the first month closing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
6 months 2.09 35.84 143 -2.19 -113.28 133.32 
12 months 8.25 55.73 142 -3.22 -105.40 248.49 
24 months 18.93 72.29 134 5.05 -135.23 245.04 
36 months 9.77 83.34 127 -7.34 -204.94 228.30 
       
Panel D: Excess or Adjusted Returns based on the six months closing price 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
12 months 5.18 -48.36 141 1.74 -48.36 179.96 
24 months 17.00 -109.62 134 -2.76 -109.62 250.70 
36 months 5.83 -173.82 127 -7.09 -173.82 238.56 
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***Significance level at 1%, **Significance level at 5%, *Significance level at 10% 
 
General Index of Each Stock Exchange (GIESE) on the last date of public offerings period. The 
second panel reports the BHAR that are calculated, taking as a reference point the closing price 
of new listings at the end of first day of their trading in the stock market and the closing price of 
GIESE at the same date while the third panel reports the adjusted returns considering as a 
reference point the end of first month of trading and the closing price of GIESE at the same 
date.  
Table 4, Panel A, reveal initial excess returns of 17.69% which is considerably low 
comparing to many country studies, Loughran et. al.[6]. This low level of underpricing is a first 
proof that Shipping Industry is mature and both underwriters and shipping issuers are doing 
very well their job. Moreover, the one year mean adjusted return that calculated according to the 
listing price, the first day closing price, and the first month closing price was -9.91%, -21.12% 
and 9.25% respectively and the corresponding three-year return was -15.72%, -29.17% and 
9.77%. These results indicate that new Shipping issues in global environment offer to investors’ 
negative returns if the investment will take place during the offer price period or the end of the 
first trading day while returns turns to be positive if someone will invest in the end of the first 
month and thereafter.  
In other words, we find evidence that investors who participated in the Global Shipping 
IPO, buying stocks at the listing price or at the closing first day price and holding them for a 
three-year period, obtained short negative returns because the listing prices of IPOs were 
slightly higher than their equilibrium prices formed at the 750th day of trading. It is also notable 
that the range of the above IPO returns is wide, fluctuating from -220.79% to 309.78% (adjusted 
returns based on listing price) from -228.96% to 281.26% (adjusted returns based on first day 
closing price) and from -204.94% to 228.30% (adjusted returns based on first month closing 
price). 
Table 5 reports the average matching firm adjusted returns (ARt) and cumulative 
average matching firm adjusted returns (CAR1,t) for the 36 months after the offering date for 
143 Shipping IPOs. Twenty nine of the 36 monthly average adjusted returns are negative, with 
only 5 of them having t-statistics lower than -2.00. After 36 months of secondary market trading 
the CAR is -35.00% which is smaller in magnitude than the -29.13% for the U.S reported figure 
by Ritter (1991). Given that the long term CARs are negative skewed a standard t-test 
overestimates the performance of IPOs. We again use skewness adjusted t-statistics combined 
with the bootstrap procedure proposed by Lyon et. al.[46]. The analysis show that the 
underperformance of IPOs is more pronounced once measured with CARs as compared to 
BHARs.    
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Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal returns (CAR) for Global Shipping Initial Public 
Offerings, 1984-2007 
Post listing long run average adjusted returns (ARt) with associated t statistics and cumulative average returns (CARt) for the 36 
months (where month one represents the market index adjusted return from the last sale price on the day of listing to the end of 
that calendar month) after going public, excluding the initial return. Our final sample constitutes with, 143 Global Shipping 
initial public offers of ordinary equity made between January 1984 and December 2007 calculated on the basis of a buy and 
hold strategy initiated using an equal euro investment in each issue purchased at the offer price for the issue. 
Month  No of firms trading ARt (%) t-stat CARt  (%) 
1 143 1.756 1.621 1.756 
2 143 0.623 0.638 2.379 
3 143 0.128 0.117 2.507 
4 143 -0.873 -0.952 1.634 
5 143 -1.146 -1.217 0.488 
6 143 -0.871 -1.021 -0.383 
7 143 -0.650 -0.732 -1.033 
8 143 -1.257 -1.127 -2.29 
9 142 -1.922 -1.835 -4.212 
10 142 -2.378 -2.582 -6.59 
11 142 -1.673 -1.512 -8.263 
12 141 -0.329 -0.493 -8.592 
13 141 0.264 0.288 -8.328 
14 140 0.491 0.564 -7.837 
15 140 -2.234 -2.502 -10.071 
16 139 -1.816 -1.723 -11.887 
17 138 -1.672 -1.821 -13.516 
18 138 -1.228 -1.309 -14.744 
19 137 -0.736 -0.756 -15.48 
20 137 -1.629 -1.692 -17.109 
21 137 -1.101 -1.081 -18.21 
22 135 -0.422 -0.439 -18.632 
23 135 0.237 0.194 -18.395 
24 134 0.713 0.673 -17.682 
25 133 -0.910 -1.064 -18.592 
26 133 -1.397 -1.452 -19.989 
27 133 -1.539 -1.623 -21.528 
28 133 -0.932 -0.981 -22.46 
29 132 -0.276 -0.334 -22.736 
30 132 -1.420 -1.253 -24.156 
31 131 -1.681 -1.773 -25.837 
32 130 -2.529 -2.703 -28.366 
33 130 -1.735 -1.811 -30.101 
34 130 -1.058 -1.05 -31.159 
35 128 -2.212 -2.212 -33.371 
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36 127 -1.634 -1.926 -35.005 
 
5. Regression Results   
Ritter’s (1991) constructed three benchmarks to measure the adjusted performance of the IPO 
firms: the size-matched, the B/M-matched, and the size-and-B/M-matched non-IPO portfolios. 
Since then size and book to-market characteristics have been documented extensively as 
important determinants of stock returns (Banz, [47]; Chan et al., [48]; Fama and French [49], 
Davis [50]; Lakonishok et al., [51]; Loughran and Ritter, [9]; Daniel and Titman, 1997; Davis et 
al., [52]; Daniel et. al. [53]. In our effort to investigate possible explanations for the long run 
underperformance of IPOs we run a series of multiple regression models, using the buy and hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR) and FF3F as dependent variables for one, two or three years after 
going public. The regression model is given as: 
 
BHAR or FF3F= a + β1 Log (1+AGE) + β2 (MRK) + β3 (UND) + β4 Log(SIZE) + β5 (H/C) + β6 (EXC) + εi 
 
 Cross sectional regressions in short and post listing returns, initially using Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) as dependent variable are reported in table 6. The results show that 
Age variable is statistically significant in the short run which lends fully support to the 
conclusion that smaller firms are subject to greater underpricing. A possible reason why our 
findings do strongly corroborate those found for U.S. IPOs is the similarities in the type of firms 
that enter the U.S. market. In the U.S., the average age of IPOs is approximately six years while 
the average age is closer to 50 years in Europe, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist [54]. We find that the 
average age of shipping companies raising money through initial public offerings, 31 years, is 
almost five times to that of the U.S. 
 Concentrating on the effects of age in the long term performance we observe that it is a 
significant factor in the three years period either if we study from the end of the first day of 
trading or from the end of the first month. The result clearly shows that firms with long history 
before they will go public perform better in the long term. This finding remain in line with U.S. 
evidence by Ritter (1991) indicating that operational experience is a signal for safe investment.  
 Second, we do not find any relation between market listing variable and underpricing. 
This result remain statistical insignificant once we look the returns in one, two and three years 
from the end of the first day of trading. Though, there is a light of significance when our study 
starts from the end of first month of trading and focus in one and three years return. The results 
in the last two cases contradicts as in the one year period it appears that Parallel/New Market 
Shipping IPOs perform better while in three years period the Main market IPOs yields better 
returns.       
Although IPO underpricing is costly for the existing shareholders (issuers) it appears that a 
decision to move in a Shipping issue with non reputable underwriters can be catastrophic in 
terms of money left in the table. Our results clearly show that all Shipping firms listed with non 
reputable underwriters experienced severe level of underpricing. Thus, the main task for the 
underwriters and especially for the reputable which charge high fees are to acquire as many 
pieces of information as possible from the market, during the pre-selling period, before setting 
the issue price in order to attempt to reduce the level of underpricing. This structure challenges 
the underwriter to choose a mechanism that encourages truthful information disclosure instead 
of downplaying it to benefit from selling shares at the full information price in the after-market. 
Further we summarize the findings for the effects of reputation of underwriters on the post-
issue performance of stocks. IPOs managed by more prestigious underwriters, significantly 
underperform IPOs conducted by less prestigious underwriters in long holding periods. This 
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performance becomes transparent once the holding period starts from the end of first month of 
trading. It seems that an investment bank’s reputation strongly impacts IPO aftermarket 
performance which is consistent with Carter et al. [40]. Opposite from this study Gajeski and 
Gresse (2006) show positive relation between the underwriters’ reputation and the long-term 
performance of IPOs while they document that IPOs managed by good investment banks 
outperform compared to the performance of IPOs managed by investment banks that have a 
relatively poor reputation in the market. 
The magnitude of returns by size do not provide any indication that smaller offers are 
subject to greater underpricing and so there is no supporting evidence for Ritter [55], Chalk and 
Peavy [56], Ritter [8] and Ibbotson et. al. [42]. The proceeds in USD generated from Shipping 
IPOs, indicates that the smaller the IPO, the greater the abnormal return of stocks up to two 
years following the IPO. Although overperformance seems to be stronger for the smaller firms 
in the 24 month long run period, it seems to disappear since the average abnormal returns of the 
small firms is statistical insignificantly over the 12-month and 36-month holding periods. In 
sum, our findings here parallel those related to firm size. A negative relationship between issue 
size and long-run performance is also inconsistent with Levis [57] and other studies of the US 
markets. Usually, issue size and company size are strongly correlated and so the larger negative 
returns of small size issues might be generated by their financially distressed position. Many 
small firms want to go public to raise a capital to finance their new investment projects and 
reduce their high level of debt. If the outcome of these projects ends up with success, this 
situation puts them in a more advantageous position, which eventually is reflected in share 
prices. 
Fifth, a factor that proves to affect the newly listed firms’ short term returns is the market 
condition (hot or cold) of the market during the period of a IPOs’ operation. Consistent with 
expectations, our findings, displayed in Table 6, confirm the effect of market conditions on the 
underperformance puzzle of Shipping IPOs. We find that cold market Shipping IPOs, on their 
first six months in the market, significantly overperform the market and hot market IPOs 
continue to do so until the end of the 36-month holding period. There is a significant difference 
between the initial (first day) average abnormal returns of cold market and hot market IPOs 
(7.75% vs. 26.71%), respectively showing that owners of hot Shipping IPOs enjoy better short 
term returns.  
The prices of hot market IPOs reverse in six months period as a result of change in beliefs 
of investors who realize too much optimism that is attributed to the new issues (overvaluation) 
under the hot market conditions after sometime following the IPO. This reversion in prices 
relative to the market generates overperformance of IPOs made on cold market. The cold 
market Shipping IPOs, which have lower initial returns due to weaker interest of investors than 
hot market Shipping IPOs, keep their outperformance for six months long-run period. IPOs in 
hot market might also be related with signalling hypothesis, which assumes that stock issue 
decision of companies is a signal given by the managers for the company shares that become 
overvalued. This statistical and economic significance of the results lead us to conclude that 
market conditions, whether hot or cold, significantly impact the post-Shipping IPO performance 
of stocks. Our results are also consistent with Ritter’s (1991) observation that long-run IPO 
underperformance may be dominated by a few years in a sample, consistent with “windows of 
opportunity” for the firm.  
The last factor we use to categorise our Shipping IPOs sample has been stock exchange 
classification. Surprisingly our results indicate that Shipping IPOs listed in the main Global 
Markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, LSE etc) experience high level of underpricing in the immediate 
aftermarket. Therefore, we expect the big number of investors associated with the major global 
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markets will create the environment for high initial returns. Their role, based on our findings, 
appears to be crucial in the long term as main stock exchanges offer better long term returns in 
one, two and three years after listing. Thus, we are supportive of the Hahn and Ligon’s (2004) 
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Table 6. Results of multiple regressions using BHAR  
Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in long run market index adjusted (excess) returns subsequent to listing for 143 Global Shipping initial public offers of ordinary equity made 
between January 1984 and December 2007, calculated on the basis of an investment in each issue purchased at the closing price of first day and first month, for a holding period of one, two and three 
years for various explanatory variables, with related t-statistics in parentheses , MAIR – Market Adjusted Initial Returns, ER1Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to first year after going public, 
ER2Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to three years after going public, ER1Y1M - Adjusted returns from first 
month price to one year after going public, ER2Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to two years after going public, ER3Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to three years after 
going public, AGE - The age of the issuing firm. The age has been calculated as the number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its constitution before the year of listing, Market - Global 
Shipping IPOs are classified among three markets. We insert the value‘1’ if an IPO listed in Main Market, and ‘0’ if listed in Secondary/Parallel /New Market , UND - Underwriters reputation: ‘1’ for 
reputable underwriters – five older, more experienced (in underwriting tasks) and with high market share and paid-in capital banking institutions – and ‘0’ for non reputable, SIZE - the logarithm of the 
total market capitalisation of an IPO, H/C - IPOs listed in the Hot Period get the value ‘1’ and IPOs listed in Cold Period get the value ‘0’,  EXC – reputation of the stock exchange IPOs are listed ‘1’ for 
reputable stock exchanges  (NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE) and ‘0’ for non reputable *** Significant at the one per cent level. **Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the ten per cent level, t-
statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance process 
 
Specifications 
(1) 
MAIR 
(2) 
ER6M1D 
(3) 
ER1Y1D 
(4) 
ER2Y1D 
(5) 
ER3Y1D 
(6) 
ER6M1M 
(7) 
ER1Y1M 
(8) 
ER2Y1M 
(9) 
ER3Y1M 
(10) 
ER3Y1Y 
Constant -24.62 3.196 21.721 149.036 -132.219 270.762 380.284 -17.091 -214.667 -145.53 
AGE  -0.229 -0.022 -0.014 0.039 0.230 0.262 0.336 -0.051 0.019 0.356 
 (-2.400)** (0.836) (-0.128) (0.714) (2.269)** (2.519)** (3.178)*** (-0.561) (0.178) (3.495)*** 
MRK  0.128 0.080 0.039 0.054 0.085 -0.015 -0.175 0.109 0.173 -0.117 
 (1.376) (0.441) (0.366) (0.603) (0.870) (-0.147) (-1.703)* (1.100) (1.670)* (-0.172) 
UND  -0.306 0.175 0.004 -0.164 -0.153 0.148 0.113 -0.224 -0.151 -0.233 
 (-3.663)*** (1.893)* (0.040)  (-1.776)* (-1.768)* (1.665)* (1.258)  (-2.536)** (-1.664)* (-2.656)*** 
SIZE  0.097 -0.013 -0.035 -0.159 0.120 -0.102 -0.125 0.009 0.057 0.160 
 (1.134) (0.890) (-0.350) (-1.673)* (1.346) (-1.106) (-1.339) (0.098) (0.601) (1.774)* 
H/C  0.197 -0.177 -0.051 -0.163 0.145 -0.018 -0.070 0.217 0.174 0.149 
 (2.346)**  (-2.010)** (-0.550)  (-1.622) (1.733)* (0.212) (-0.811)  (2.533)** (1.982)** (1.765)*  
EXC 0.281 -0.008 -0.037 0.082 0.055 0.202 0.154 0.173 0.156 0.053 
 (3.514)*** (0.931) (-0.385) (0.378) (0.626) (2.239)** (1.687)* (1.957)* (1.698)* (0.600) 
           
Adj. R2 0.219 0.059 0.005 0.097 0.132 0.094 0.101 0.113 0.087 0.172 
No. of IPOs 143 143 142 134 127 144 143 134 127 143 
F-statistic 5.994 1.328 0.955 1.917 2.281 2.222 2.324 2.716 1.969 4.163 
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Table 7. Results of multiple regressions using FF3F abnormal returns  
Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in long run for the Fama and French (FF) three factor model Rpt-Rft=αi+βi(Rmt-
Rft)+γiSMBt+δiHMLt+εpt subsequent to listing, 143 Global Shipping initial public offers of ordinary equity made between January 1984 and 
December 2007 calculated on the basis of an investment in each issue purchased at the closing price of first day and first month, for a 
holding period of one, two and three years for various explanatory variables, with related t-statistics in parentheses, MAIR – Market 
Adjusted Initial Returns, ER1Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to first year after going public, ER2Y1D - Adjusted returns from 
first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to three years after going public, ER1Y1M - 
Adjusted returns from first month price to one year after going public, ER2Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to two years after 
going public, ER3Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to three years after going public, AGE - The age of the issuing firm. The 
age has been calculated as the number of years that each listing firm is in operation since its constitution before the year of listing, Market - 
Global Shipping IPOs are classified among three markets. We insert the value‘1’ if an IPO listed in Main Market, and ‘0’ if listed in 
Secondary/Parallel /New Market , UND - Underwriters reputation: ‘1’ for reputable underwriters – five older and more experienced in 
underwriting tasks banking institutions – and ‘0’ for non reputable, SIZE - the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, H/C - 
IPOs listed in the Hot Period get the value ‘1’ and IPOs listed in Cold Period get the value ‘0’,  EXC – reputation of the stock exchange 
IPOs are listed ‘1’ for reputable stock exchanges  (NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE) and ‘0’ for non reputable *** Significant at the one per cent 
level. **Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the ten per cent level, t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity using the 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance process 
 
Specifications 
(1) 
ER1Y1D 
(2) 
ER2Y1D 
(3) 
ER3Y1D 
(4) 
ER1Y1M 
(5) 
ER2Y1M 
(6) 
ER3Y1M 
Constant 23.749 112.969 174.860 -28.758 -13.496 95.251 
AGE -0.018 0.124 0.211 0.248 -0.033 0.015 
 (-0.205) (1.689)* (2.203)** (2.547)*** (-0.395) (0.112) 
MRK 0.058 -0.058 0.102 -0.177 0.125 0.187 
 (0.616) (-0.895) (1.021) (-1.793)* (1.320) (1.814)* 
UND  0.003 -0.045 -0.179 0.099 -0.216 -0.164 
 (0.037)  (-0.754) (-1.921)** (1.047)  (-2.416)** (-1.723)* 
SIZE  -0.026 0.088 0.133 -0.147 0.013 0.078 
 (-0.280) (1.311) (1.416) (-1.536) (0.132) (0.881) 
H/C  -0.721 -0.131 0.161 -0.058 0.212 0.163 
 (-0.750)  (-1.775)* (1.813)* (-0.671)  (2.316)** (1.852)** 
EXC  -0.052 -0.081 0.041 0.171 0.148 0.152 
 (-0.565) (-1.212) (0.446) (1.827)* (1.612) (1.611) 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.091 0.147 0.113 0.124 0.071 
No. of IPOs 143 134 127 143 134 127 
F-statistic 1.228 1.854 2.341 2.694 2.776 1.685 
notion that initial public offering underpricing boosts the subsequent secondary market liquidity 
(and long term returns) of the stock.  
 Turning to table 7, where the returns are measured by Fama and French three factors 
model, there is an interesting change in the results. We do not find any factors associated 
significant with any level of underpricing in the short term. In the long term field ‘old’ firms 
continue to offer better returns in a period up to one year and less reputable underwriters 
constitute a signal for good returns in two and three years period. Hot market condition remains 
a significant variable which indicates positive returns in two and three year’s time while listing 
in a Major stock exchange can be an indication for satisfactory returns in one year period. 
Overall our findings give support to Krigman et al. [58] that first-day winners continue to be 
winners over the first year, and first day losers continue to be loser for the same period.
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6. Conclusion 
This study provides unique evidence in the international literature by examining the 
performance of Global Shipping IPOs and scrutinizing the factors that might be effective on 
their performance. Specifically, using a sample of 143 IPOs launched on the Various Stock 
Exchanges over the 1984-2007 period, this study documents an average adjusted first day return 
of 17.69%. The results of the study reveal that Global Shipping IPOs continue to outperform on 
a number of relevant benchmarks (BHAR and CAR), in the 12 and 24 months holding period 
following their listing in the market. On average, the Shipping IPOs were underperforming their 
market benchmark by -9.91%, -4.40% and -15.72%, after one, two and three years of listing 
correspondingly. These rates of returns are considered very interesting, as they are consistent 
with those reported by Ritter (1991).  
Shipping companies which entered the market during the hot period are seen to 
experience more underpricing of their share issues than the companies listed during the cold 
period. In the context of avoiding leaving a lot of ‘money on the table’, shipping companies may 
have to be more careful once they list during the hot periods in order minimize potential stock 
market underpricing. Furthermore, young shipping companies exhibit higher underpricing than 
those shipping offering with long operation history. This is related to information signalling to 
market participants, implying a kind of ‘private’ valuation by shipowners into the age of the 
firm before going public. Risk averse shipowners would improve expected utility by holding a 
diversified portfolio and not only a large stake in their own firm. Since this is not the case in 
companies with short history, it may signal that these shipowners are based on an implicit ‘fair’ 
firm value. In this case, shipowners of old companies would prefer to forego diversification 
benefits but avoid selling undervalued stocks. As investors realize shipowners’ positioning, they 
would be keen to invest on shipping stocks of companies where owners are retaining larger 
holdings. 
In order to detect the long-run performance phenomenon IPOs were classified under 
different characteristics, as discussed in the methodology section, and their significance was 
examined. Results show positive relationship between IPOs launched in the market after long 
operation history and their long run returns and negative relationship between firms launched in 
the stock market with reputable underwriters and their returns in the long term. Findings show 
positive relationship between IPOs listed in hot market period and their future returns. Listing in 
one of the major stock exchanges in the world is a positive signal for investors to participate in 
new shipping listings and significantly affects their returns in a three-year period. Surprisingly, 
there is no evidence for Shipping IPOs seeking listing in the primary/parallel markets. Overall, 
the results of the multivariate regressions concerning the long-run IPO performance revealed 
five statistically significant variables. 
Offerings of Shipping IPOs appear to follow a “boom or bust” cyclical pattern in recent 
decades, not only in the U.S., but also in all countries. In “hot” markets, issuers all “want to get 
through the window at the same time.” In “cold” markets, on the other hand, it is sometimes 
difficult for issuers to sell stock at any reasonable price. The last fully support the timing 
hypothesis i.e. managers of Shipping firms choose a window of opportunity to launch shipping 
IPOs. Initially those managers prefer to take their firms public when they have performed well 
earlier, and probably the IPO date is conditional on the firm’s cycle of activity and operational 
performance.  
To understand the Shipping IPO market in depth, further study should be implemented, 
focusing on the allocation of shares to institutional and individual investors. It would be 
interested to search the allocation mechanisms which are divided into three categories: fixed-
price offerings, auctions and book-building. By definition, book-building procedures are 
 23 
handled solely by investment banks. Auction and fixed-price mechanisms can either be 
managed by underwriters or provided by exchanges. It would great to explore the problems that 
markets faces in this crucial area and suggest solutions which can improve the whole operation 
of Shipping IPOs.   
 The question that remains is how Shipping IPOs case differentiates from other studies of 
the area and provides comparatively low underpricing in the short term and low 
underperformance in the long-term to its investors. The explanation to this puzzle and support to 
our findings is given by the theory of ‘flipping activity’. The theory suggests that there should 
be periods when investors are particularly confident about shipping firms’ future projects and 
profits, and that managers are induced to make offerings of shipping IPOs in these periods. This 
finding is consistent with Krigman’s et al. view (1999) that active buy and sell trades in the 
aftermarket during the first day of trading, is a good indication of future stock price 
performance. Therefore, the long-term low underperformance is a correction for this excess of 
optimism.  
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APPENDIX A: Leading Global Shipping IPOs by Market Capitalization 
Company Country of Listing Market Cap (USD billion) 
A.P. Moller Denmark 32.67 
MISC Malaysia 7.67 
MOL Japan 7.04 
NYK Japan 7.03 
Bollore France 5.39 
Teekay US 3.05 
Cosco China 3.03 
‘K’ Line  Japan 2.99 
Frontline Norway 2.84 
Hyundai MM South Korea 2.53 
OSG US 2.34 
OOIL Hong Kong 2.22 
Evergreen Taiwan 1.89 
Kirby US 1.85 
Bergesen Gas Norway 1.77 
Hanjin South Korea 1.67 
China Shipping China 1.61 
Torm Denmark 1.60 
NOL Singapore 1.60 
W. Wilhelmsen Norway 1.58 
Safe Bulker US 1.03 
 
APPENDIX B: Stock Price of Selected Shipping Companies since IPO in the U.S. 
Company  IPO Date Market  IPO Price 
($) 
First Day 
Close ($) 
Price ($) 
10/10/08 
Top Ships 23 Jul’04 NASDAQ 11.00 10.60 3.00 
Dry Ships 3 Feb ‘05 NASDAQ 18.00 20.20 19.09 
Diana 18 Mar ‘05 NYSE 17.00 17.30 14.54 
Teekay LNG 5 May ‘05 NYSE 22.00 24.30 11.38 
Aries Maritime 3 Jun ‘05 NASDAQ 12.50 12.97 1.26 
Eagle Bulk 23 Jun’05 NASDAQ 14.00 13.50 7.49 
TBS Intern. 24 June ‘05 NASDAQ 10.00 10.05 8.01 
Quintana 15 Jul ‘05 NASDAQ 11.50 11.26 7.04 
Genco 22 Jul ‘05 NASDAQ 21.00 20.87 17.96 
Seaspan 9 Aug ‘05 NYSE 21.00 19.42 12.77 
Horizon 27 Sep ‘05 NYSE 10.00 10.75 5.00 
Excel 15 Sep ‘05 NYSE 21.00 15.95  
ACL 7 Oct ‘05 NASDAQ 21.00 28.30 6.12 
StealthGas 6 Oct ’05 NASDAQ 14.50 13.70 6.89 
Double Hull  13 Oct ‘05 NYSE 12.00 12.05 3.98 
Omega Navig. 7 Apr ‘06 NASDAQ 17.00 16.00 6.83 
Danaos 6 Oct ‘06 NYSE 21.00 20.85 9.32 
Ultrapetrol 13 Oct ‘06 NASDAQ 11.00 10.54 3.81 
Aegean Marine 8 Dec ‘06 NYSE 14.00 15.00 11.37 
TEEKAY Offsh. 14 Dec ’06 NYSE 21.00 25.00 8.20 
Capital Product 30 Mar ‘07 NASDAQ 21.50 26.75 7.75 
Oceanfreigh Inc 25 Apr ‘07 NASDAQ 19.00 19.31 7.37 
Paragon Ship.  10 Aug ‘07 NASDAQ 16.00 14.50 5.50 
OSG America L.P 9 Nov ‘07 NYSE 19.00 18.75 6.45 
Navios Maritime 13 Nov ‘07 NYSE 20.00 19.25 5.06 
TEEKAY Tankers 13 Dec ’07 NYSE 19.50 20.01 9.70 
Safe Bulkers 29 May ‘08 NYSE 19.00 18.90 7.00 
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